Insights from experimental economics on local cooperation in a small-scale fishery management system

Cooperation is central to collective management of small-scale fisheries management, including marine protected areas. Thus an understanding of the factors influencing stakeholders' propensity to cooperate to achieve shared benefits is essential to accomplishing successful collective fisheries management. In this paper we study stakeholders' cooperative behavioral disposition and elucidate the role of various socio-economic factors in influencing it in the Roviana Lagoon, Western Solomon Islands. We employed a Public Goods Game from experimental economics tailored to mimic the problem of common pool fisheries management to elucidate peoples' cooperative behavior. Using Ostrom's framework for analyzing social-ecological systems to guide our analysis, we examined how individual-scale variables (e.g., age, education, family size, ethnicity, occupational status, personal norms), in the context of village-scale variables (e.g., village, governance institutions, group coercive action), influence cooperative behavior, as indexed by game contribution. Ostrom's framework provides an effective window for conceptually peeling back the various socio-economic and governance layers which influence cooperation within these communities. The results of our research show that the most important resource user characteristics influencing cooperative behavior were age, occupation and beliefs about giving access to others to fish for commercial gain. Through elucidating the factors affecting stakeholders' propensity to cooperate to achieve shared benefits, our analysis provides guidance in understanding cooperation in relation to collective management of marine resources. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.