4.4 Article

Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism

期刊

EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
卷 31, 期 2, 页码 109-117

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.09.004

关键词

Altruism; Cooperation; Reputation; Indirect reciprocity; Dictator game; In-group favoritism

资金

  1. Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [19330139, 08J05455]
  2. Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [08J05455, 19330139] Funding Source: KAKEN

向作者/读者索取更多资源

To test the hypothesis that sensitivity to monitoring drives people to act altruistically toward members of their own community, two experiments investigated whether an eye-like painting promotes altruism toward in-group members, but not toward out-group members. Participants played the role of dictator in a dictator game with another participant (a recipient) who was from the minimal in-group or out-group. Participants knew whether their recipient was an in-group member or an out-group member, but were informed that their recipient did not know the group membership of the dictator. In-group favoritism occurred only when participants were facing a computer desktop which displayed a painting of eyes, but did not occur in the absence of eyes. These findings demonstrate that the eye painting displayed on the participant's computer screen worked as a cue for monitoring and thus enhanced the participant's altruistic behavior. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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