期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 221, 期 1, 页码 175-185出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.036
关键词
Game theory; Coalition formation; Games in partition function form; Shapley value
资金
- Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [19046001] Funding Source: KAKEN
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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