期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 213, 期 1, 页码 320-328出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.03.035
关键词
Decision analysis; Game theory; Resource allocation; Terrorism; Natural disaster
资金
- Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University Programs through Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California [2007-ST-061-000001]
Defenders concerned about protecting multiple targets can either protect them individually (through target hardening), or collectively (through overarching protections such as border security, public health, emergency response, or intelligence). Decision makers may find it relatively straightforward to choose which targets to harden, but are likely to find it more difficult to compare seemingly incommensurate forms of protection - e.g., target hardening, versus a reduction in the likelihood of weapons being smuggled across the border. Unfortunately, little previous research has addressed this question, and fundamental research is needed to provide guidance and practical solution approaches. In this paper, we first develop a model to optimally allocate resources between target hardening and overarching protection, then investigate the factors affecting the relative desirability of target hardening versus overarching protection, and finally apply our model to a case study involving critical assets in Wisconsin. The case study demonstrates the value of our method by showing that the optimal solution obtained using our model is in some cases substantially better than the historical budget allocation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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