期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 204, 期 2, 页码 255-262出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.10.016
关键词
Supply chain management; Mean-variance analysis; Supply chain coordination
资金
- Hong Kong Research Grants Council [PolyU 5143/07E]
In this paper, we explore the use of a wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme (WPPS) for coordinating supply chains under the mean-variance (MV) decision framework. We first analytically establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for coordinating the centralized supply chain by WPPS. We then show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with WPPS in the decentralized case. After that, we discuss the information asymmetric case in which the retailer can be benefited by pretending to be more risk averse. Finally, we propose a new measure for the manufacturer to prevent this cheating from happening. Insights are generated. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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