期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 194, 期 1, 页码 155-162出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.11.060
关键词
Game theory; Vulnerability; Defense; Attack; Protection; False targets; Decoy; Contest success function
The paper analyzes the efficiency of deploying false targets its part of a defense strategy. It is assumed that the defender has a single object that can be destroyed by the attacker. The defender distributes its resource between deploying false targets and protecting the object from Outside attacks. The attacker cannot distinguish the false targets from the defended object (genuine target). Therefore the attacker has no preferences for attacking one target rather than another target. The defender decides how many false targets to deploy whereas the attacker decides how many targets to attack. The article assumes that both the defender and attacker have complete information and full rationality. The optimal number of false targets and the attacked targets are obtained for the case of fixed and variable resources of the defender and the attacker its solutions of it non-cooperative game between the two agents. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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