期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 185, 期 2, 页码 864-883出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.01.020
关键词
gaming; research and development; coexistence of cooperation and competition; firm-specific decisions
In this paper, we study the strategic R&D collaboration by introducing a virtual player to reveal cooperative incentives and keeping investment share and market share independent of each other. Not consistently with the traditional opinions, we show that the superiority of the R&D cartel is due to the coexistence of cooperation and competition when spillovers are exogenous. Moreover, we conclude that high R&D input share must be reflected implicitly by high market share, and that firms' R&D decisions vary with firms' specific characteristics when spillovers is endogenous. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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