期刊
ENERGY POLICY
卷 65, 期 -, 页码 270-274出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.009
关键词
Waste cooking oil; Biofuel; Subsidy mode
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71173116, 71203151]
- National Social Science Foundation of China [13CGL094]
- Humanities and Social Science Foundation of Ministry of Education [09YJA630065]
- Philosophy and Social Science Fund in Jiangsu Province [2011SJB790019, 2012SJD630114]
- Jiangsu Environmental Protection Scientific Research Fund [2012086]
- China Institute of Manufacturing Development [20120200-10]
- Major Project of Key Research Base of Philosophy and Social Science Fund in Jiangsu Province [2012JDXM012]
Many countries are concerned with the waste-to-energy for economic development and societal welfare. This paper constructs a dynamic game model that, for the first time compares the incentive effects of four common subsidy modes on waste cooking oil supply for biofuel refining and sales of waste cooking oil refined products. The model considers the impact of preferential tax treatment, a raw material subsidy, a sales subsidy and an investment subsidy on the profits of biofuel enterprises and waste cooking oil recyclers. Results indicate that common approaches adopted in developed economies such as raw material price subsidies and finished products sales subsidies increase the profits of both biofuel enterprises and recyclers. On the contrary, investment subsidies, which are relatively common in some regions of China, increase the profits of recyclers, while reducing revenues achieved by biofuel enterprises. To promote the supply chain, policy should give priority to raw material price subsidies and finished products sales subsidies, and for investment subsidies, however, the government should be cautious. Crown Copyright (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据