4.4 Article

The sequential prisoner's dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation

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ECONOMIC JOURNAL
卷 111, 期 468, 页码 51-68

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OXFORD UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00588

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we investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we analyse the extent to which co-operation is conditional on first-mover co-operation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (United Kingdom vs. United States) and gender. We find the most important variable influencing cooperation is the first-mover's choice, supporting the argument that co-operative behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional altruism. However, we also find that cooperation decreases with repetition, and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises.

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