期刊
CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS
卷 23, 期 2, 页码 140-151出版社
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180113000674
关键词
animal models; mental illness; psychiatric disease; model validity; anthropomorphism; nosology
Animal models of human disease play a central role in modern biomedical science. Developing animal models for human mental illness presents unique practical and philosophical challenges. In this article we argue that (1) existing animal models of psychiatric disease are not valid, (2) attempts to model syndromes are undermined by current nosology, (3) models of symptoms are rife with circular logic and anthropomorphism, (4) any model must make unjustified assumptions about subjective experience, and (5) any model deemed valid would be inherently unethical, for if an animal adequately models human subjective experience, then there is no morally relevant difference between that animal and a human.
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