期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
卷 28, 期 3, 页码 288-297出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.09.005
关键词
Vertical differentiation; Capacity; Bertrand competition
类别
Both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition However, their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed In this article, we consider a three-stage game in which firms choose quality, then commit to capacity and, finally, compete in price When the cost of quality is negligible, we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium, in other words, capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved
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