期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
卷 26, 期 1, 页码 25-35出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002
关键词
Intergroup competition; Cooperation; Public goods; Experiment
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据