期刊
PRAGMATICS & COGNITION
卷 18, 期 3, 页码 561-569出版社
JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
DOI: 10.1075/pc.18.3.04gal
关键词
blindsight; consciousness; higher-order theories; intentionality; non-reflective self-awareness; phenomenality
I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.
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