期刊
DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS
卷 22, 期 1, 页码 43-61出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491668
关键词
Secrecy and deception; Truthful disclosure; Homeland security; Resource allocation; Game theory
类别
In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation. Our model allows us to explore whether the first mover should disclose correct information about her resource allocation, incorrect information, or no information. Although we study secrecy and deception specifically in the homeland-security context where the first mover is assumed to be the defender, our work can also provide insights in other contexts, such as business competition.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据