期刊
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT
卷 44, 期 7, 页码 2611-2637出版社
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
DOI: 10.1177/0149206316648383
关键词
agency theory; headquarters-subsidiary relationships; bounded rationality; self-interest; opportunism; culture; institutions; multidomestic; global; transnational MNCs
资金
- CIBER (Center for International Business Education and Research)
- Sonoco International Business Department at the Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina
This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters-subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problemself-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary-level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of self-interest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.
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