期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS
卷 25, 期 2, 页码 243-264出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2017.1401282
关键词
Upstream-Downstream; E-Books; Agency Model or Wholesale Pricing; Promotion by Retailers; Asymmetric Outcome
类别
Apple's choice of the agency model (i.e., Apple demands a share from the retail price set by the publishers) when entering the e-book market was surprising because: (i) the upstream firms can accrue all rents in a simultaneous move game if it determines the retail price; and (ii) the incumbent, Amazon, used wholesale pricing arrangements. This paper compares the two different contract types, pure and mixed: one retailer opts for wholesale, the other for the agency model. Departing from a standard and symmetric oligopolistic setup of Bertrand competing retailers and producers, the model accounts for retailers having (a) a significant contribution to the final value and (b) a strategic first-mover advantage. Both conditions combined are necessary (but not sufficient) in order to explain Apple's choice and the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium.
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