期刊
IEEE ACCESS
卷 7, 期 -, 页码 14623-14636出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2893459
关键词
Power control; anti-jamming; three-layer Stackelberg game; Stackelberg equilibrium
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61671473, 61771488]
- Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars of Jiangsu Province [BK20160034]
- Open Research Foundation of Science and Technology on Communication Networks Laboratory
This paper investigates the multi-user power control problem in relay-assisted anti-jamming systems. Because of the hierarchical confrontation characteristics between users and jammer, we take the incomplete information and observation error into consideration and formulate an anti-jamming Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game, in which primary users act as leaders, relay users act as vice-leaders, and jammer acts as a follower. Both users and jammer have the ability to sense others' transmission power and choose optimal power to realize the maximum of utility. Based on the backward induction method, we propose a multi-user hierarchical iterative algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) and prove the existence and uniqueness of SE. Finally, simulation results are compared with the Nash equilibrium to verify the effectiveness of the proposed game. Moreover, both the influence of incomplete information and the observation error on utility are analyzed.
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