期刊
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 46, 期 7, 页码 928-940出版社
INST OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.46.7.928.12038
关键词
product positioning; sequential entry; first-mover advantage; game theory
This paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures. It shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost, it positions away from the most attractive location in the market; further, the larger the second-mover's cost advantage, the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location. The payer also models uncertainty in the first-mover's mind about the later-entrant's cost structure, and shows that an increase in this uncertainty (in the sense of mean-preserving spread) also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market. Overall, this payer suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure, it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product.
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