期刊
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS
卷 43, 期 2, 页码 583-617出版社
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/467466
关键词
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We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political entry is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the rival's welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation las proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included.
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