4.5 Article

Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind

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COGNITION
卷 77, 期 1, 页码 B25-B31

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ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00096-2

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cognitive development; false belief task; theory of mind

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The false belief task has often been used as a test of theory of mind. We present two reasons to abandon this practice. First, passing the false belief task requires abilities other than theory of mind. Second, theory of mind need not entail the ability to reason about false beliefs. We conclude with an alternative conception of the role of the false belief task. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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