期刊
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
卷 21, 期 6, 页码 411-427出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00055-6
关键词
prisoner's dilemma; social exchange; heuristic; reciprocity
We propose that a social exchange heuristic is as important as the cheater detection mechanism for attaining mutual cooperation in social exchange. The social exchange heuristic prompts people to perceive a mixed-tnotive situation, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), as an Assurance Game (AG) situation in which cooperation is a personally better choice than defection insofar as the partner is cooperating as well. We demonstrate the operation of the social exchange heuristic through a comparison of the ordinary one-shot, simultaneous PD with the one-shot, sequential PD. Participants in the current experiments, involving a total of 261 volunteers, committed a logical error in the direction of favoring mutual cooperation as the situation involved more serious consequences, This result strongly suggests the operation of a domain specific bias that encourages pursuit of mutual cooperation in social exchange. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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