4.2 Article

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AND ITS ALLEGED META-ETHICAL FALLACIES

期刊

BIOETHICS
卷 23, 期 4, 页码 193-201

出版社

WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x

关键词

empirical ethics; is-ought problem; naturalistic fallacy; fact-value distinction

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.2
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据