期刊
BIOETHICS
卷 23, 期 4, 页码 193-201出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x
关键词
empirical ethics; is-ought problem; naturalistic fallacy; fact-value distinction
This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.
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