期刊
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
卷 37, 期 1, 页码 161-169出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0829
关键词
ultimatum bargaining; fairness; equity
类别
In this note we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. E. Bolton and R. Zwick (1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 95-121). More specifically, we replaced exactly equal splits by nearly equal splits either (slightly) favoring the proposer or the responder. Such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust. We find, however, a significant change in behavior: Fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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