期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 104, 期 1, 页码 247-272出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914
关键词
auctions; quantal response; experiments; risk aversion
类别
This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding depends on the cost of overbidding relative to underbidding, as predicted theoretically. We use QRE as an error structure to estimate parameters of several competing models of overbidding. A QRE model based on risk averse bidders closely tracks the exact distribution of bids. The estimated parameters are significant and consistent across treatments. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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