期刊
NEW IDEAS IN PSYCHOLOGY
卷 20, 期 2-3, 页码 163-198出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/S0732-118X(02)00007-7
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The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult folk psychology. We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a copy theory that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving Interpretive Theory of Mind allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
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