期刊
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
卷 117, 期 3, 页码 817-869出版社
OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC
DOI: 10.1162/003355302760193904
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Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of social preferences. We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare-sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients-than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior.
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