4.3 Article

The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth

期刊

COGNITIVE SCIENCE
卷 26, 期 5, 页码 521-562

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1

关键词

concepts; epistemology; meta-cognition; knowledge; overconfidence

资金

  1. NICHD NIH HHS [R37 HD023922-17A1, R01 HD023922, R37 HD023922] Funding Source: Medline

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People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion-an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1-6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7-10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies I I and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition. (C) 2002 Leonid Rozenblit. Published by Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

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