期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 107, 期 2, 页码 453-462出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2949
关键词
common property resources; fair allocation; core
类别
A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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