期刊
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE
卷 27, 期 7, 页码 1297-1321出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00258-3
关键词
corporate governance; dividend policy; simultaneous equations
This paper investigates the relationship between dividends and the ownership and control structure of the firm. For a panel of Austrian firms over the 1991/99 period, we find that state-controlled firms engage in dividend smoothing, while family-controlled firms do not. The latter choose significantly lower target payout levels. Consistently, state-controlled firms are most reluctant and family-controlled firms are least reluctant to cut dividends when cuts are warranted. The dividend behavior of bank- and foreign-controlled firms lies in between state-and family-controlled firms. This is consistent with the expected ranking of information asymmetries and managerial agency costs. The above results hold for firms with good investment opportunities. We find that firms with low growth opportunities optimally disgorge cash irrespective of who controls the firm. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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