期刊
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
卷 100, 期 18, 页码 10564-10567出版社
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1731324100
关键词
-
The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据