期刊
ENERGY POLICY
卷 32, 期 4, 页码 455-465出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00148-4
关键词
climate change policies; coalition games; induced technological charge
This paper investigates climate control coalition games. It studies whether incentives exist for non-cooperating, nations like the USA to join a coalition based upon issue linkage. Issue linkage is considered through increased R&D expenditures triggering improved technological innovations that advance energy efficiencies. Model calculations demonstrate that incentive.,,, exist for non-cooperating countries like the USA to join a climate control coalition if nations cooperate on technological innovations. Restrictions on trade Such as sanction mechanisms against non-cooperating Countries are not necessarily an incentive to join a coalition. Technological spillover effects lead to improved economic Situations and increased energy efficiencies in non-cooperating countries. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据