期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
卷 22, 期 6, 页码 759-782出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.03.002
关键词
agglomeration; circular city; cournot; location oligopoly; spatial competition
类别
We study the location choices by Cournot oligopolists in a circular market, where consumers are located uniformly along the circumference. We analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of a two-stage location-quantity game. We demonstrate that the equidistant location pattern is only one of the many equilibrium location patterns that arise in a circular market. Nonequidistant, multiple or a continuum of location equilibria may also arise. Both spatial agglomeration and dispersion, or a combination of agglomeration and dispersion may occur in equilibrium. In the case of infinitely many location equilibria, we establish the welfare equivalence of the equilibrium location patterns. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据