期刊
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY
卷 28, 期 3, 页码 147-170出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00222500490480202
关键词
potential game; stochastic stability; agent-based simulation; residential segregation
Using dimes and pennies on a checkerboard, Schelling (1971, 1978) studied the link between residential preferences and segregational neighborhood patterns. While his approach clearly has methodological advantages in studying the dynamics of residential segregation, Schelling's checkerboard model has never been rigorously analyzed. We propose an extension of the Schelling model that incorporates economic variables. Using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory, we mathematically characterize the model's long-term dynamics.
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