期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 156, 期 2, 页码 415-419出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00903-7
关键词
simple games; weighted majority games; dimension; real voting systems
In this note it is proved that the European Union enlargement voting system under two different decision rules (simple majority of countries or qualified majority of 2/3) adopted in the Nice European summit, held in December 2000, has exactly dimension 3. This result clarifies that these voting systems cannot realize either as a weighted voting system or as the intersection of two weighted voting systems and, therefore, it is useful to prove the existence of well-known real voting systems of dimension 3. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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