期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
卷 54, 期 4, 页码 533-550出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.03.005
关键词
residential segregation; potential function; stochastic stability; agent-based simulation
类别
This paper presents a variation of the Schelling [J. Math. Sociol. 1 (1971) 143; T.C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Norton, New York, 1978] model to show that segregation emerges and persists even if every person in the society prefers to live in a half-black, half-white neighborhood. In contrast to Schelling's inductive approach, we formulate neighborhood transition as a spatial game played on a lattice graph. The model is rigorously analyzed using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory. We derive our primary results mathematically and use agent-based simulations to explore the dynamics of segregation. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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