Designing a reproductive health services package in the universal health insurance scheme in Thailand: match and mismatch of need, demand and supply

In October 2001 Thailand introduced universal healthcare coverage (UC) financed by general tax revenue. This paper aims to assess the design and content of the UC benefit package, focusing on the part of the package concerned with sexual and reproductive health (SRH). The economic concept of need, demand and supply in the process of developing the SRH package was applied to the analysis. The analysis indicated that SRH constitutes a major part of the package, including the control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, the promotion and maintenance of reproductive health, and early detection and management of reproductive health problems. In addition, the authors identified seven areas within three overlapping spheres; namely need, demand and supply. The burden of disease on reproductive conditions was used as a proxy indicator of health needs in the population; the findings of a study of private obstetric practice in public hospitals as a proxy of patients' demands; and the SRH services offered in the UC package as a proxy of general healthcare supply. The authors recommend that in order to ensure that healthcare needs match consumer demand, the inclusion of SRH services not currently offered in the package (e.g. treatment of HIV infection, abortion services) should be considered, if additional resources can be made available. Where health needs exist but consumers do not express demand, and the appropriate SRH services would provide external benefits to society (e.g. the programme for prevention of sexual and gender-related violence), policymakers are encouraged to expand and offer these services. Efforts should be made to create consumer awareness and stimulate demand. Research can play an important role in identifying the services in which supply matches demand but does not necessarily reflect the health needs of the population (e.g. unnecessary investigations and prescriptions). Where only demand or supply exists (e.g. breast cosmetic procedures and unproven effective interventions), these SRH services should be excluded from the package and left to private financing and providers, the government playing a regulatory role.