期刊
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL B
卷 44, 期 1, 页码 129-135出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5
关键词
-
We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation ( C) or defection ( D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据