期刊
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 33, 期 3, 页码 235-247出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2004.04.007
关键词
e-tail and retail chain; Bertrand and Stackelberg price competition; supply chain; distribution channels
In addition to regular retail distribution channels, a firm nowadays can avail themselves of such information technology (IT) as the Internet to distribute products directly on line (referred to as an e-tail distribution channel). The mix of retailing with e-tailing has added a new dimension of competition to the firm's distribution channels. The central issue of this competition is the competitive pricing policies between retail and e-tail distribution channels. In this paper, we consider the price competition between these two channels under two market game settings: the Bertrand and the Stackelberg price competition models. In the Bertrand competition, the manufacturer and retailer simultaneously select e-tail and retail price, respectively, while in Stackelberg competition, the manufacturer as a leader selects the e-tail price, then the retailer selects retail price. We obtain both the Bertrand and Stackelberg equilibrium pricing policies, and compare the profit gains under these two competitions. Based on our results, we propose an appropriate strategy for the manufacturer to adopt when adding an e-tail channel. We also show that an optimal wholesale price V exists under a different market structure that could be used to encourage the retailer to accommodate the additional e-tail channel. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据