期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
卷 55, 期 220, 页码 452-461出版社
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00410.x
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D.M. Armstrong has objected that the dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that if this objection succeeds against dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.
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