4.2 Article

Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks - An experimental study

期刊

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
卷 26, 期 5, 页码 711-731

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ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2004.04.003

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experiment; investment game; indirect reciprocity; strategic behavior

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A cyclical network of indirect reciprocity is derived organizing 3- or 6-person groups into rings of social interaction where the first individual may help the second, the second the third, and so on until the last, who in turn may help the first. Mutual cooperation is triggered by assuming that what one person passes on to the next is multiplied by a factor of 3. Participants play repeatedly either in a partners or in a strangers condition and take their decisions first simultaneously and then sequentially. We find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual cooperation, although strategic considerations and group size are important too. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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