期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 167, 期 2, 页码 475-492出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.045
关键词
game theory; modelling; optimization; inspections
Inspections for timely detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second kind errors are modelled as a sequential, two-person game. The utilities of the players, inspector and inspectee, are assumed to be linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. Sets of Nash equilibria are obtained in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probability one. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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