期刊
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
卷 79, 期 2, 页码 431-468出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004
关键词
executive compensation; managerial incentives; risk taking; investment policy; financing policy
We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据