期刊
ECONOMIC THEORY
卷 28, 期 1, 页码 197-211出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x
关键词
bank panics; liquidity provision; deposit insurance; moral hazard
类别
In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems.
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