期刊
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
卷 290, 期 1-2, 页码 421-437出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-3028-3
关键词
Supply chains; Pollution responsibility allocation; Game theory; Shapley value
This paper provides a normative framework based on cooperative game theory aimed at studying the problem of pollution responsibility allocation across multi-tier supply chains. The model is further developed with reference to the case of a linear supply chain, by using three responsibility principles (namely: Upstream, Downstream and Local Responsibility). Allocation rules are derived; also, desirable properties in terms of fairness, efficiency and transparency are introduced, in order to characterize such rules. Furthermore, a stability concept for efficient allocations is formulated. An example of a possible application of the introduced cost allocation rules is provided.
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