A fuzzy-based reliability approach to evaluate basic events of fault tree analysis for nuclear power plant probabilistic safety assessment

Fault tree analysis has been widely utilized as a tool for nuclear power plant probabilistic safety assessment. This analysis can be completed only if all basic events of the system fault tree have their quantitative failure rates or failure probabilities. However, it is difficult to obtain those failure data due to insufficient data, environment changing or new components. This study proposes a fuzzy-based reliability approach to evaluate basic events of system fault trees whose failure precise probability distributions of their lifetime to failures are not available. It applies the concept of failure possibilities to qualitatively evaluate basic events and the concept of fuzzy sets to quantitatively represent the corresponding failure possibilities. To demonstrate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the actual basic event failure probabilities collected from the operational experiences of the David-Besse design of the Babcock and Wilcox reactor protection system fault tree are used to benchmark the failure probabilities generated by the proposed approach. The results confirm that the proposed fuzzy-based reliability approach arises as a suitable alternative for the conventional probabilistic reliability approach when basic events do not have the corresponding quantitative historical failure data for determining their reliability characteristics. Hence, it overcomes the limitation of the conventional fault tree analysis for nuclear power plant probabilistic safety assessment. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.