期刊
LABOUR ECONOMICS
卷 13, 期 5, 页码 519-549出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2005.03.001
关键词
tournament; threshold public good; alternating-offer bargaining game; endogenous allocation of prizes; experiment
类别
We present a model where compensation within a team is determined either exogenously by a third party or endogenously through a bargaining process among team members. In the exogenous case, we compare equal rewards with a tournament design. In the endogenous case, members compete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of the prize. Failure to reach an agreement on the: proposal is costly and the role of proposer rotates in the order of members' efforts. We show in an experiment that tournaments induce higher efforts than equal rewards and that the influence of exogenously or endogenously allocating the prize depends on the specific bargaining rules in the endegenous case. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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