期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
卷 22, 期 1, 页码 105-115出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2006.888986
关键词
competition; complementarity; Cournot; mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC); Nash equilibrium; oligopoly
In this paper, oligopolistic competition in a centralized power market is characterized by a multi-leader single-follower game, and formulated as a nonlinear programming (NLP) problem. An ac network is used to represent the transmission system and is modeled using rectangular coordinates. The follower is composed of a set of competitive suppliers, demands, and the system operator, while, the leaders are the dominant suppliers. The ac approach allows one to capture the strategic behavior of suppliers regarding not only active but also reactive power. In addition, the impact of voltage and apparent power flow constraints can be analyzed. Different case studies are presented using a three-node system to highlight the features of the formulation. Results on a 14-node system are also presented.
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