期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 244, 期 4, 页码 722-728出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.012
关键词
game theory; cooperation; prisoner's dilemma
We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed population of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non-contingent mobility in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that cooperative behavior is not only possible but may even be enhanced by such an always-move rule, when compared with the strongly viscous (never-move) case. In addition, mobility also increases the capability of cooperation to emerge and invade a population of defectors, what may have a fundamental role in the problem of the onset of cooperation. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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