Supplier bidding strategy based on non-cooperative game theory concepts in single auction power pools

In single auction power pools. only generators bid several energy price segments depending on the amount of energy supply, at individual generating companies' (GENCO) own discretion, for every trading interval. Then all selected bidders are paid a uniform Market Clearing Price (MCP). In this paper, it is realized that each GENCO has the complete information on its own payoff as well as the other parties' payoffs, corresponding to each potential combination of choices of strategies by all the players. Specifically, all the suppliers attempt to estimate the others' bids using the concept of Nash equilibrium in the general sense of profit maximization. Under some simplified assumptions, this problem can be modeled as a simultaneous-move game confronted by the bidders. Here, the system demand forecast by competitive sellers is captured for the purpose of constructing the optimal bidding strategy. Finally, a numerical example is presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed solution scheme. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.