期刊
IIE TRANSACTIONS
卷 39, 期 5, 页码 465-479出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC
DOI: 10.1080/07408170600941599
关键词
supply chain management; channel coordination; channels of distribution; asymmetric information
We investigate how a supplier can use a quantity discount schedule to influence the stocking decisions of a downstream buyer that faces a single period of stochastic demand. In contrast to much of the work that has been done on single-period supply contracts, we assume that there are no interactions between the supplier and the buyer after demand information is revealed and that the buyer has better information about the distribution of demand than does the supplier. We characterize the structure of the optimal discount schedule for both all- unit and incremental discounts and show that the supplier can earn larger profits with an all-unit discount.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据